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Theories and approaches on regional economic development are characterised by 
an overwhelming plurality and a missing coherent unifying conceptual framework. 
Consequently, in politics and applied science regional economic development is often 
discussed in a simplified manner as judged by the following two criteria. Firstly, regions 
are conceptualised as separable entities, irrespective of scale and neglecting their potential 
dependence and interrelatedness. Secondly, the discussion often concentrates on one of the 
many theoretical concepts at a time.  
This conceptual reductionism is often applied in order to secure analytical 
tractability. As a matter of fact the simultaneous acceptance of all these qualifications 
would have dramatic consequences in terms of rising complexity. If, for example, we 
consider Marshallian externalities simultaneously with the possibility of spatial price 
discrimination, differing agglomeration-patterns should be expected depending on the 
historically caused differing industry-structures. Qualitative knowledge on characteristics 
of different industries then becomes relevant for the assessment of economic development 
potentials in different regions and on different regional scales. Torre (2008) classifies 
industries along two dimensions: (1) the strength of the organization of inter-firm relations 
and (2) the strength of localisation-tendencies of inter-firm relations. He summarizes some 
possible reasons for disadvantages of agglomerations. According to his classification of 
industries the weight of these (dis-)advantages may differ for different industries and firm-
sizes. Therefore, localities within regions might be differently affected by forces of 
agglomeration depending on the prevailing industry structure. These differentiated 
patterns of economic development on small scale geographic levels have seldom been 
analysed so far. 
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Storper and Walker (1989) have stressed the relevance especially of large and 
innovative enterprises for the economic development of regions. Markusen (1996) has 
worked out a scheme of differing local business structures depending on the types of 
industries that characterise the regional economy. Spatial consequences of these 
differences within the regions under consideration have not been addressed in depth, 
though. Much less so has the concrete relevance of the qualitative differences for small-
scale localities been in the focus of systematic empirical analyses so far. Nevertheless, 
small scale spatially differentiating effects are important for two reasons. Firstly, their 
observation allows drawing conclusions on the very nature of spatially differing industry 
structures. Secondly, small scale heterogeneity in the relation between industry structure 
and local prosperity is of social relevance if we consider the question of endogenous 
potentials of localities for self-sustained developments. Regional policies have to be 
designed differently, depending on the way by which localities depend on their economic 
surrounding. 
Thereby, the second shortcoming of many analyses as identified in the first 
paragraph, the definition of regions irrespective of the problem of separability and scale-
effects turns out to be critical. The lower the scale of observation is, the stronger is the 
dependence of the separate regions on their environment and on other regions. The higher 
the scale of observation is, the less pronounced is the specifity of different regions and 
thereby the variance to be explained. The continuum of space consists of virtually 
innumerably many “types” of regions and techniques of rather arbitrary segregation might 
cause misleading results due to oversimplification and misleading generalisations. This 
problem has been identified by Robinson (1950) and labelled as “ecological fallacy”.  
We try to assess the real-world complexity that results from spatial dependencies 
and resulting small-scale heterogeneity with a specific quantitative approach. The 
technique of indirect closure therein allows us to handle the problem of scarce data on low 
spatial dimensions while we model spatial dependencies within a mixed multi-level model. 
2  The theoretical concept 
 
We analyse the relationship between regional industry-structure, geographic 
location and the type of agglomeration-effects respectively small-scale competition among 
industry-locations. We are especially interested into the degree to which the 
municipalities’ situation is determined by the larger economic environment. The 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
competitiveness of locations depends on its attractiveness for new firms and on the 
willingness to leave of existing firms. We view the existing situation as the result of these 
very forces. Given structures therefore reveal the respective strength of the economic 
forces involved. Therefore, we interpret a high business-intensity as an expression of 
otherwise unobserved factors that contribute positively to business location. These we call 
“agglomeration factors”. We conclude that firms’ willingness to settle down (their “entry-
mobility”) is positively related to agglomeration-factors.  
On the other hand those firms that entered last are expected to have the highest 
exit-mobility for two reasons. Firstly, they have not yet built up a strong regional 
embeddedness. Secondly, there are certain industries, which are principally immobile or 
able to pass on possible local disadvantages to their customers (regional monopolistic 
competition). We assume that the strength of agglomeration-forces and the relation of 
entry- and exit mobility of firms depend on the local industry-structure, on the region’s 
remoteness and on a combination of these two factors. Industry-dynamics determine 
regional competition between potential industry-locations. If, for example, a regional 
economy is geographically characterised by local agglomeration-forces, then some 
localities are characterised by the attraction of new firms, while the other localities’ 
development will largely depend on the development of these agglomerations. If, on the 
other hand agglomeration-forces are low, then this causes the majority of localities to 
strive for the attraction of industries. 
Nevertheless, the foundation of firms and firm-exits are not well documented in 
German statistics and especially on the small regional scale of municipalities only very 
few economic indicators exist. Therefore we take advantage of the fact that in Germany a 
local business-tax exists with municipalities exerting autonomous choice of the tax-rates. 
In order to optimise their choice, municipalities have to consider the institutional rules of 
federal redistribution of fiscal resources as well as the competition-effect of their decision. 
In the federal system of redistribution, the single municipality’s contribution is calculated 
on the basis of business-tax-revenue less the share that is due to a higher tax-rate. This 
proceeding is supposed to prevent tax-rates from a race to the bottom in ruinous 
competition among industry-locations. In the following discussion we abstract from these 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
institutional aspects
1 since their effects on the relation between tax-rate and tax-revenues 
are of linear nature and we restrict ourselves on the interpretation of relative effects among 
neighbouring municipalities.  
We concentrate on the competition-effect of the local business-tax. In our approach 
the relation between tax-rate and tax-revenue under different conditions serves as an 
indicator for the type of competition between municipalities. Specifically the relation is 
assumed to reveal the strength of non-observable agglomeration-forces at a low-scale 
regional level. This proceeding of “indirect closure” somehow reverses the proceeding of 
causal inference as described by Pearl (2000).The competition-effect influences the 
observed relation between the local tax-rate and local business-tax revenues (figure1). 














Source: Own figure 
 
In figure 1 one-directional arrows represent causal relations, which cannot be 
observed as indicated by the dotted lines. We also do not observe the net growth in 
industry-capacity on the local level nor are we able to take track of firms’ propensity to 
leave their location, their exit-mobility. We only observe the tax-rate and the business-tax 
revenue in the single municipalities. We also estimate their relation under different 
circumstances, as indicated by the solid, double-headed arrow. This estimated gross effect 
is determined by the direct causal effect that the tax-rate exerts upon tax-revenues and by 
the unobserved causal effects as they are depicted by the other dotted arrows. If the 
relation was determined by the outer triangle of causal arrows, the observed gross effect 
would be strongly positive. According to this figure, if new industry-settlement is on a 
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high [low] level, tax rates will be high [low] and tax-revenues will be high [low], too. This 
moderated indirect positive relation adds to the positive direct effects. We call this indirect 
positive relation between tax rates and tax revenues the agglomeration effect. 
If, on the other hand, we take into consideration that with a growth in industry-
capacity the mobility of existing and of new firms rises, we expect municipalities to lower 
their tax rate. On the contrary, if the net growth in the number of firms is low, the firms’ 
exit-mobility is low, too. Tax rates in this case are chosen relatively high in spite of the 
low tax-revenues. If this “competition-effect” is high, the positive relation between tax 
rate and tax revenue becomes lower and turns finally negative: the higher the net-growth 
in firm-number the lower in this case the tax rate but the higher the tax revenue.  
So far, a strong positive relation between tax rate and tax revenue is interpreted as 
an indicator for agglomeration effects. This means a development along a low-growth path 
for some localities and along a high-growth path for others. A negative relation in contrast 
has been interpreted as indicator for a competition-effect that is, for the potentially equal 
distribution of growth among municipalities. There is one ambiguity in the interpretation 
of the relation described. The discussion seems to imply that in each region either the 
agglomeration or the competition effect prevails. It is rather probable, though, that in a 
region the competition-effect dominates among those municipalities, which are negatively 
affected by the agglomeration effect of the high-growth municipalities. This would imply 
that among municipalities with high growth-rates we observe a positive relation between 
tax-rates and tax revenues and among those with low growth rates we observe a negative 
relation between tax rates and tax revenues. In this case, those municipalities with a 
medium tax-rate would show the lowest tax-revenues. The rational for this expectation is 
that low tax-rates in this case are an indicator for potentially mobile firms and thereby for 
a rather vital economy. Higher tax rates in the presence of low tax-revenues show that 
municipalities maximise tax revenues in taking advantage of the immobility of the few 
remaining firms. In the empirical investigation we are going to test this hypothesis by the 
inclusion of quadratic terms. 
There is a possible endogeneity in this problem: Tax-rates influence firms’ mobility 
and vice versa. Therefore, in figure 1 the arrows between tax rate and “net growth in 
industry capacity” respective “firms’ exit mobility” and the respective signs of causality 
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could be reversed. Nevertheless, tax-rates may be adapted to a changing mobility of firms 
much faster than the mobility of firms may react towards changed tax-rates. Additionally, 
we assume to observe relations between tax rate and tax revenues that are the result of 
rational, optimizing behaviour of local authorities. Therefore, if we explained an observed 
negative relation between tax rate and net growth in industry capacity the critical reader 
would have to ask, why municipalities do not lower their tax-rates in order to overcome 
this disadvantage. The only answer would be that some underlying unobserved causes 
justify this behaviour, which leads us back to the direction of causality chosen in figure 1. 
3  Estimation of the relations 
3.1 Data 
 
In the following we explain business tax revenues in the municipalities per 
inhabitant statistically by local business tax rates and other regional characteristics such as 
indicators of remoteness and industry-structure. Local business taxes are the main source 
of municipality funds. The tax revenue per inhabitant is an (imperfect) indicator of the 
municipalities’ industry-intensity and of their institutional wealth. While in Germany in 
2008 there existed 12.300 municipalities of great spatial heterogeneity, in this study as in 
many others we work with 4628 assemblies that have been created in order to provide 
roughly comparable units of analyses with respect to size (BBSR 2011a). Some indicators 
are provided on this basis, others have been aggregated or the assemblies’ mean-values of 
their municipalities have been created. If not stated otherwise in the following the term 
“municipalitiy” refers to the respective assemblies of municipalities. In the analysis we 
differentiate between urban and rural municipalities. Municipalities are classified as 
“urban” if they show typical urban characteristics. They may have less than 20.000 
inhabitants. The residual group of municipalities is named “rural” (BBSR 2011c). In the 
estimation a dummy-variable has been created in order to differentiate between rural and 
urban municipalities according to this classification. Another dummy-variable 
differentiates between municipalities in western and in eastern counties of Germany. Table 
1 shows basic statistics describing business-tax revenues in those 4551 municipality-
assemblies used in the analysis. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
Table 1: Description of business tax revenues per inhabitant 2007 (Euro) in German 
municipalities (N=4551) 
Local business tax
City 244 210.12 155.54 26.30 1132.50
Rural 782 182.67 337.31 -97.30 4501.70
City 1192 386.82 459.16 -94.50 7149.90




N Mean Std.dev. Minimum
 
Remark: Data are net the municipalities’ contribution to the federal system of fiscal redistribution 
Source: Own calculation based on (INKAR 2009) 
 
The table shows that the mean municipalities’ business tax revenues per inhabitant 
net their contribution to the federal system of fiscal redistribution is higher in rural 
municipalities than in urban municipalities and higher in the west than in the east (before 
reunification). Explanatory variables of the statistical model are presented in table 2.  
The share of employed inhabitants has been included due to the fact that the tax 
revenue is given in relation to the number of inhabitant. It therefore corrects for the 
different employment-intensities in the populations of municipalities. The relative 
commuting balance is central in that it helps to differentiate between economically central 
and economically peripheric municipalities. The tax-rate variable has been differentiated 
into the mean-value of each labour-market region (BBSR 2011b) and the deviations of the 
tax rates of the single municipalities within these labour-market regions from the 
respective mean. 
The same procedure has been applied to the Principal Components (PCs), which 
describe the municipalities’ position in the economical geography. The respective PCs 
have been constructed with the help of central variables in the definition of “rurality” and 
“remoteness”. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables (N=4551) 
Type Meaning Source
municipality




254.97 351.58 -243.50 7149.90
Commute_balance Ratio In- minus outcommuting 




-0.28 0.41 -0.92 3.26
Employment Raw Share of employed adult 
inhabitants
51.71 4.66 24.70 92.90
labour market region
mean_Taxrate Aggregate Mean tax rate 343.22 30.20 294.79 457.08
municipality
dev_Taxrate Deviation Deviation of mean tax rate 0.00 23.99 -141.70 171.46
labour market region
meanPC_Central Mean "Centrality" 0.00 0.96 -3.01 3.04
meanPC_Rural Mean "Rurality" 0.00 0.48 -0.76 1.81
meanPC_Remote Mean "Remoteness" 0.00 0.46 -1.04 1.94
municipality
devPC_Central Deviation of Mean "Centrality" 0.00 1.19 -11.15 7.74
devPC_Rural Deviation of Mean "Rurality" 0.00 0.78 -2.50 8.68
devPC_Remote Deviation of Mean "Remoteness" 0.00 0.88 -4.27 7.32
district
IndustryDiv Industry-diversity 25.70 2.18 16.00 30.00
HighQuali Highly qualified labour force -1.11 2.04 -5.42 10.58
HotelPublTransp Hotel Public Transport -0.01 2.13 -8.91 7.32
DominatingAuto Dominating Enterprise Automotive -0.22 1.46 -6.41 8.74
Medium-Size Medium-Size Enterprizes 0.08 1.53 -7.00 3.95
Public Public Service -0.11 1.36 -9.55 4.43
SimpleProd Simple Products 0.22 1.22 -3.98 4.71
Retail Retail Industry -0.23 1.16 -3.43 4.71
ChemiPharma Chemical - Pharma -0.01 1.18 -11.06 4.10
Finance Finance -0.17 1.14 -5.76 4.20
PaperPrintVehicl Paper Printing SpecialVehicles 0.07 1.11 -6.52 4.87
ChemiGum Chemical - Gum -0.04 1.11 -3.99 6.83
DataElectro Data Electronics -0.03 1.08 -5.73 5.06
Engineer Engineering offices 0.05 0.96 -5.38 4.58
SpecialProd Special Production 0.00 1.01 -6.57 5.60
MachinesTextile Machines Textile 0.03 1.02 -3.79 4.19
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Source: Own calculation based on sources stated in the table 
 
The loadings of the identified Principal Components are reported in table 3. It can 
be shown that the PC labelled “Rural” has high loadings in eastern German municipalities. 
This is attributable to the fact that in western Germany family-farms dominate, whose 
labour is self-employed and not included in the statistic of dependent employees. 
Comparable “rural” municipalities in the western counties can be shown to have a low 
value in all of the three uncorrelated PCs. They will therefore make up the reference-group 
or the intercept in the estimated model. Actually it will become obvious that their results 
are comparable to those with a high value in the PC “Rural”. 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
Table 3: Loadings of the principal components on geographical position 
Original Variables
Share of employees in services 0.36 0.31 0.84
Distance of middle-order centre (travel-time) -0.70 -0.08 0.28
Distance of high-order centre (travel-time) -0.68 0.01 0.17
Distance of agglomeration-centre (travel-time) -0.68 -0.19 0.31
Share of employees in agriculture & forestry -0.49 0.83 -0.25




Source: Own calculation with SAM (Rangel et al. 2010) based on sources stated in table 2  
 
While the other variables were available on the municipality-level this is not the 
case for the number of firms and of employees in the different industries. Due to statistical 
non-disclosure rules these are only accessible on the district-level. Variables describing 
the industry-structure on district level include the share of employees with different 
educational levels, the share of firms in different size-classes in terms of employees and 
the share of firms in each of 85 industries (two-digit NACE-Classification). From the 
latter the information on the 20 branches of the manufacturing sector was included. The 
branches of the service-sector have been further aggregated, resulting in 25 aggregated 
service-industries. With these 45 variables and those on firm-size and education on 
district-level 15 PCs have been constructed. Due to space-limitation we omit the 
presentation of all loadings. The description of the variables in table 2 refers to those 
original indicators with the highest loadings on the different PCs. 
3.2 The  model 
 
The statistical model has to reflect the hierarchical structure of the data that 
became obvious in the discussion of table 2. The rational lying behind this hierarchical 
design is the idea that the economic situation of the municipalities depends only to a 
certain degree on the municipality’s specific conditions. It is also influenced by the 
conditions in the further environment that is, in the districts and labour-market-regions. 
Therefore, the municipality’s relative situation as compared to its neighbouring 
municipalities might be of higher relevance in the explanation of its specific situation than 
absolute values.  
In order to capture these dependencies statistically consistently we simultaneously 
estimate fixed and random effects in a mixed model. An excellent introduction to this type 
of models is in Singer and Willett (2003). In the Multi-level approach the determinants on 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
the different levels are explicitly considered (Singer 1998). At level one the 
municipalities’ tax revenue is expressed in the unconditional model as the sum of an 
intercept (π0j) and a random error associated with the i
th municipality in the j
th district (εij) 
(ibid.): 
Revenueij = π0j + εij.           ( 1 )  
At the second level the district-level intercept π0j is expressed as the sum of the 
overall mean (γ00) and the districts’ random deviations from that mean (ξ0j) (ibid.): 
π0j = γ00 + ξ0 j          (2). 
Substitution yields the final unconditional model: 
Revenueij = γ00 + ξ0j + εij.        ( 3 ) .  
This description generalises easily to the three-level approach by the inclusion of 
an additional random effect (ζ0j) in equation (3).  
With respect to the explanatory variables the expectation of a heterogeneous effect 
of tax-rate on tax-revenue is central to our argument. The actual heterogeneity of the 
relation between tax-rate and tax-revenue even on a rather large scale may easily be shown 
by the spatially differentiated coefficient of tax-rate in explaining tax-revenue in a simple 
linear but spatially weighted regression-model (GWR). The spatial distribution of this 
coefficient in Germany is shown graphically in figure 2.  




Source: Own figure 
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Therefore, if we include the tax-rate in our first-level equation (equation (1))  
Revenueij = π0j + π1j Taxrateij + εij.         ( 4 )  
we should not only consider systematic (spatial) variations of the intercept as in 
equation 2 but also of the coefficient for “Taxrate”: 
π1j = γ10 + ξ1 j          (5). 
This gives us in the integrated model 
Revenueij = γ00 + γ10Taxrateij+ ζ0j  + ξ0j + ξ1jTaxrateij + εij. (6). 
Similarly we expect the commuter-balance (see table 2) to relate differently to tax-
revenues, depending on the respective relevance of agglomeration effects in the different 
districts: 
Revenueij = γ00 + γ10Taxrateij  +  γ20Commuterij + ζ0j + ξ0j + ξ1jTaxrateij  
                  + ξ2jCommuterij + εij.       ( 7 ) .  
In the estimation the possibility of co-variation between the different estimated 
variance-components is being taken into account. Table 4 presents the resulting estimated 
random effects of our model.  













With fix and random tax-rate and commuter-balance effects
Labour-market region 2010
District 17846 -324 25737
Tax-rate effect -324 16 -470




District 7738 -99 8885
Tax-rate effect -99 5 -82
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The overall mean γ00 as determined by the unconditional model without further 
fixed effects is 261 (Euro per inhabitant). According to table 4 in the unconditional model 
about 90% of the total variance is attributed to the errors at the lowest level (εij), that is, to 
the municipalities. The remaining variance is attributed by the estimation to differences 
between districts and labour-market regions. Consequently, the variance between 
municipalities within larger regions is much higher than the variance between these larger 
regions
2. The inclusion of the deviation of the municipalities’ tax-rates from the labour-
market region’s mean tax-rate and of the relative commuter-balance of the municipalities 
as fixed effects reduces the variances between higher-level observational units by about 
50% ant between municipalities by about 20%. Nevertheless, the additional inclusion of 
both variables as random effects doubles the reduction in observed variances in tax-
revenue on the municipality level making it now 40%, while the observed variance on the 
district-level jumps up. Obviously, controlling the effects of tax-rate and of commuter-
balance helps in the identification of systematic differences in tax-revenues between 
districts. 
Interpretation of the covariances offers some additional insights. The negative 
covariance between district-level variation and a varying tax-rate effect shows, that the 
higher the tax-revenue in the district the more negative the tax-rate effect. Similarly, we 
observe that a more positive effect of the commuter-balance on tax-revenues coincides 
with a more negative relation between tax-rates and tax-revenues. This means that with a 
strong positive impact of agglomeration-effects on tax-revenue, the competition effect that 
is caused by the rising exit-mobility of firms prevails. Obviously we have to differentiate 
between agglomeration in labour and agglomeration in terms of production-capacities. 
Other fixed effects besides those with expected heterogeneous effects my simply be 
included as such in the model depicted in equation (7). If the random-effects connected 
with the tax-rate and the commuters are to be explained, though, the respective fixed 
effects have to be interacted (Singer 1998). This may easily be understood if considering 
the heterogeneous effect of tax-rates as modelled by equation (5). If the variation in the 
                                                 
2
 This is in sharp contrast to results of a similar model that explains local unemployment-rates (own 
unpublished work). 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
estimated coefficient is explained for example by “Centrality” we get starting from 
equation (2) and (5) 
π0j = γ00 + γ01Centralityij + ξ0 j        (8) and 
π1j = γ10 + γ11Centralityij + ξ1 j        (9). 
Integration in equation (4) yields 
Revenueij = γ00 + γ01Centralityij + γ10Taxrateij+  γ11CentralityijTaxrateij  
                     + ζ0j  + ξ0j + ξ1jTaxrateij + εij.      (10). 
 
Concretely, we explain the effect of commuter-balance and of the tax-rate  
–  by the geographical position on the level of the municipality (devPC_Central, 
devPC_Rural and devPC_Remote in table 2), 
–  by the industry-structure on district-level (the last block in table 2), 
–  by an interaction of these two, 
–  by themselves (inclusion of quadratic terms) and 
–  by each other (interaction of commuter-balance with tax-rate). 
 
The whole model, that is, each single coefficient, is additionally interacted with the 
dummy-variable that differentiates rural from urban municipalities. Thereby, the 
possibility is acknowledged that there are qualitative differences in the spatial structures 
of urban and rural observations. The final model explains 68% of the originally observed 
variance on the municipality-level (see table  4) and the larger proportion of all other 
variance-components, too. 
For the estimation for each variable values from urban and rural municipalities 
have been centred on their respective mean in order to facilitate interpretation and the 
assessment of the term’s significance. Generally, the significance of the conducted step-
wise model extensions has been tested by the likelihood-ratio test. Therefore, all models 
have been estimated with the maximum-likelihood approach. Nevertheless, maximum-
likelihood estimation tends to deliver biased estimates of random effects. Therefore, the 
model has been re-estimated with the restricted maximum-likelihood approach for the 
interpretation of coefficients. 
The final model that takes into account all of the interactions considered consists of 
711 fixed effects besides the intercept. It is therefore not possible to present the results in 
table form here. Moreover, due to the manifold interaction-terms the interpretation of the 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
raw-coefficients is very difficult. Generally, the non-interacted coefficients are to be 
interpreted as the reference-values. Coefficients of interacted terms represent deviations 
from these reference-values. Their significance shows, whether a significant deviation 
from the reference-value exist. Therefore, in order to assess the gross-effect of an 
explanatory variable, all of the interaction-terms in which it is included have to be 
summed up. This is what we do in the following. That means in order to assess the 
relevance of an explanatory variable we sum up the respective coefficients of their nested 
interaction-terms and compare them with the summed up non-nested interaction terms. In 
order to access the relevance and the size of the different effects in doing so each single 
coefficient is multiplied with one standard deviation of the explanatory variable. In the 
case of interaction terms the standard deviation is constructed by the multiplication of the 
standard deviations of the variables involved in the interaction. 
3.3 Results 
 
Results are presented graphically. In the different graphics we compare the 
estimated tax-revenue with one standard-deviation of non-nested cumulated effects. In 
figure 3 we compare the estimated gross-situation for the simulated situations that one of 
the PCs on industry-structure at a time is higher by respectively one standard deviation. 
Since the variables had been centred to their mean this implies that we compare the 
situations where one of the industry-PCs is by one standard deviation above its mean 
while the others are at their mean-value. In the same vein a low [high] tax-rate depicts a 
tax-rate that is one standard deviation below [above] its mean value. A municipality is in a 
“peripheric” [“rural”, “central”] position if the according PC for geographic position is 
one standard deviation above its mean, and there is a high [low] commuter balance if the 
corresponding condition is given with respect to this variable. 
Figure 3 depicts the situation for rather peripheric urban municipalities, comparing 
municipalities with a negative (top) and a positive (bottom) commuter-balance.  51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
Figure 3: Tax-revenue with low, medium and high tax-rate in rather peripheric urban 









































































































Source: Own figure based on results from the multi-level model estimated with SAS, PROC Mixed 
 
Obviously, two different types of agglomeration-effects are measured by observing 
commuters on one side and the effect of tax-rates on the other. It is among municipalities 
with a negative commuter-balance that a high tax-rate is often associated with higher tax-
revenues per inhabitant. Obviously among these municipalities there exist some with a 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
specialised local labour force or other unobserved advantages, which are able to attract 
certain firms more than other municipalities with a negative commuter-balance. This holds 
especially true where hotel- and restaurant industry is important and where information-
services as well as the production of electronic equipment and clothes dominate. In the 
same figure the low revenues with medium tax-rates confirm an expectation formulated in 
chapter 2: Among the low potential municipalities with negative commuter-balance there 
are some municipalities that are characterised by extremely immobile industries precisely 
because their development lacks any dynamic. Here, the tax-rate is set relatively high even 
though tax revenue is very low. Besides this effect we can conclude for urban 
municipalities in a rather peripheric position with a negative commuter balance that in 
most cases their relative situation is best depicted by the agglomeration effect: There are 
many with very low revenues and a low tax rate and a few with rather high revenues and a 
high tax-rate. 
This pattern is different among urban municipalities in a rather peripheric position 
with a positive commuter-balance (bottom figure in figure 3). The majority of them show a 
negative relation between tax-rate and tax revenue. This means that their more dynamic 
development depends on the decisions of firms with a higher (exit-)mobility. Due to the 
positive relation between new settlement and exit-mobility municipalities with the most 
positive dynamic decide for the lowest tax-rate. The figure shows that this does not only 
hold true in relative terms but also in absolute terms: According to estimation results 
among urban municipalities with a positive commuter-balance in rather peripheric 
position, business-tax revenues are highest if the business-structure is characterised by 
engineering-services and the local tax-rate is low. Obviously, among these municipalities 
there is at the same time a higher potential for convergence due to the high mobility of 
firms than among those types of municipalities that are characterised by those 
agglomeration-effects that are indicated by a positive relation between tax-rate and tax-
revenue. This negative relationship among the municipalities with negative commuter-
balance in the top figure in contrast hints on immobile location-factors that raise the 
relative competitiveness of some of them. Therefore it would be wrong to expect that all 
municipalities have the same potential to profit from certain industry-structures even if 
they are of the same type in terms of remoteness and settlement character. 
Results may be presented differently in order to underline the argument (figure 4). 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
Figure 4: Effect of the first and second raise of the tax-rate in urban municipalities with a 





































































































































Source: Own figure based on results from the multi-level model estimated with SAS, PROC Mixed 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
Here the difference in tax-revenues between the medium tax-rate and the lowest 
tax-rate and between the highest tax-rate and the medium tax-rate as shown in figures 3 
are isolated for urban municipalities with a negative commuter-balance in rather 
peripheric, “rural”, and central relative position (from top to bottom). Obviously, the 
pattern that the first difference in tax-rate relates negatively to tax-revenue while the 
second difference relates positively to it, which corresponds to the low-revenue situation 
with a medium tax-rate, is typical for peripheric regions with their generally low economic 
dynamic. Only here makes tax-revenue maximization via tax-rate maximization by taking 
advantage of the immobility of the remaining few firms sense. If we compare the relation 
between higher tax-rates and differences in tax-revenues for relatively “rural” and 
“central” municipalities it is clarified by figure 4 that the dominance of agglomeration 
effects as described by a positive relation between tax-rate and tax-revenue is more 
prevalent among municipalities of rather “rural” position, while the dominance of the 
competition effect as described by a negative relation between tax-rate and tax-revenue is 
more prevalent among municipalities of rather “central” position. There are some 
industry-structures for which the competition-effects seems to dominate in all 
geographical positions, such like the high-qualification dimension. Others have a 
heterogeneous impact upon the competition between similar locations such as information 
services and production of electronic equipment (“DataElectro”), which causes a 
dominating agglomeration effect among peripheric and central municipalities but not so 
among “rural” communities. 
4 Conclusions 
 
It was our goal to isolate systematically differing small-scale agglomeration-
patterns, which indicate different types of competition between localities. We applied a 
technique of indirect closure based on the differing observed relation between local 
business tax-rate and tax-revenue and used a mixed multi-level model in order to cope 
with local dependencies on different scales. Thereby it was shown that small-scale 
agglomeration effects, i.e. differing development potentials of similar municipalities, are 
at least partially determined by settlement characteristics, geographical relative position 
and industry structure. Since these influences interact in various ways the observed 
patterns are very complex. It is due to small-scale “agglomeration-effects”, defined here as 
a positive observed relation between tax-rate and tax-revenue, that municipalities of the 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA), 2011, Barcelona 
same type may nevertheless have different potentials in economic development. On the 
other hand, a high mobility of firms in a dynamic environment strengthens the 
competition-effect as indicated by a negative relation between tax-rate and tax-revenue. 
Under such circumstances municipalities will strive for convergence. In empirical studies 
comparing regional developments on various geographical scales these heterogeneous 
relations will have to be taken into account in order to reach generalisable conclusions. 
Regional economic policy cannot apply identical concepts independently of the wider 
economic environment. Instead it has to react to the differing endogenous potentials of 
localities for economic development. 
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